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The article considers "new" theories of the public, sometimes also
called "postmodern" theories, which emphasize the openness of
the mediated public sphere and plurality of symbolic publics,
which can find the modus of their interests with the help of the
steering capability of the system of influence. The author argues
that it is possible to envisage a consensus between symbolic
publics only because the theories are funded in the liberal
tradition, which presupposes the interests and rationality of the
members of the publics to be autonomous in relation to the
material conditions in which they live. When historical-material
thought is applied, two types of inequalities that permeate the
system of influence are revealed, the structural and the relational
one. These in reality lead to the formation of partial publics and
a fragmented public sphere. However, public actors do not call
into question the origins of the mentioned inequalities, because
in times of the hegemony of immaterial labor, they (public actors)
are both consumers and producers of ideological forms, which
engender an "objective" world view based on the model of
circulation (the market). The creation of the common worldview
in turn creates the neutral base for a "new" kind of refeudalization
of the public sphere. This is now carried out by classes and
members of the public that did not take part in the "classical"
intrusion of private interests into the public sphere in the time of
modernity.
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At the end of the 20th Century, many theories rejected critical
politico-economic analysis of the opportunities for citizens to
participate in the political public sphere. The work of the Ger-
man philosopher Jürgen Habermas is a very good example of
the way in which the prevalent conception of the public be-
gan changing, from an analysis of the demise or refeudaliza-
tion1 of the liberal public in the 1960s (1989a), to the begin-
ning of the 1990s, when he revised his theory and united lib-
eral and republican points of view in laying the foundations
of a new conception of the public (1994). In his earlier work,
Habermas interpreted critically the ingression of organized
private interests into the public sphere. However, in his re-
cently revised model of the public sphere, the public is sup-
posed to be able to recognize and prevent manipulative ten-
dencies from affecting it directly. Such an about-face in inter-
pretation of the sovereignty of the public in modern democ-
racies is the result of change in the geo-political organization
of the World, development and application of new technolo-
gies, changes in class structure, recognition of interpretation
capabilities of the members of the public, and, even, direc-
tions of research, which developed under the auspices of
post-structuralism and post-modern theories of society. Be-
sides Habermas, one should also mention John B. Thompson
and Leon H. Mayhew, whose work focuses not so much on
the political view of the public, but rather on the role of the
media in the transformation of the space and time of the pub-
lic opinion formation processes or rather on the role of sym-
bolic dimensions of the public, especially, on the representa-
tion and influence of public actors. Thus, Thompson refers to
"a new kind of publicness", which no longer consists of ex-
changes of arguments among members of the public through
dialogue, but rather denotes the openness of the public sphere,
visibility of contents, mediatization of symbolic forms, and
the structural inequality between producers and receivers of
messages (Thompson, 1995, 245). Messages are now produced
for an undefined member of a mass audience, who interprets
and evaluates, in isolation, conveyed arguments, which can,
but might also not, induce him to action, to seek new infor-
mation or to form new relationships and alliances. According
to Leon Mayhew's theory, which is presented in his work
named The New Public (1997), advocates of a certain public
affair help rational individuals in forming their view, while in
the same time these advocates compete among themselves
for the favorable disposition of dispersed members of the pu-
blic. In this way, the public is divided into influential leaders
and a silent majority of those they lead, who recognize each
other in what is for them the most favorable mediatized sym-







Influence is the principal means by which bounded ra-
tionality works, so it is meaningful to criticize the mass
media as an institution based on influence. Assistance in
economizing the search for information is precisely what
people expect of the media. Nor is it realistic to bemoan
the superficiality of the media in relation to the notion of
an informed citizenry, for creating a highly informed public
is not the way the process of public information is played
out. (Mayhew, 1997, 253-254)
Because the mentioned theories many times designate re-
cent phenomena as "new", I also speak about "new" or "newer"
theories. They build upon the plurality of public actors, which
struggle for visibility and influence in an endless sea of media,
content, demands, offers, representations, while members of
the public, armed both with rationality and with their pas-
sions, inclinations, and desires choose the most appropriate
proponent of their interests or, rather, the most convenient
form of truth about a certain matter of public affairs. Each
publication of an opinion spawns a symbolic public, which
public speakers try to depict as attractive as possible. Mean-
while, the interpretative abilities of the audience (the poten-
tial public) play a central role in forming opinions of its mem-
bers. Even Jürgen Habermas in his recent theory emphasizes
the symbolic dimension of the political influence of public fi-
gures, which (political influence) "must ultimately rest on the
resonance and indeed the approval of a lay public whose com-
position is egalitarian" (Habermas, 1996, 364). However hier-
archical the context in which the media and public figures' act
may be, their influence is based on arguments, which the lay
public extracts from a flood of symbols, according to both Ha-
bermas and Mayhew. Arguments are the content of influence,
which confers an egalitarian and communicative character on
persuasion processes, Mayhew follows Talcott Parsons (1967)
from whom Habermas derives his concept of influence as
well. However, considering influence in conjunction with so-
cial status, influence is backed by arguments only in the final
phase of persuasion that – and this is the central thesis of this
article – never comes under objective conditions, gaining in-
fluence as a means of persuasion which permeates the social
hierarchy. Mayhew argues the contrary, leaving particular
interests of actors of different social standings unquestioned
and transformative in direction of "consensual" society: "Va-
lues determine social status, status confers prestige, prestige
implies respect and respect is a resource for influence. By this
account, the entire system of stratification can be regarded as
a moral order within which exemplars of social values contri-
bute to social integration by influencing others to conform to







society's integrative needs" (Mayhew, 1997, 28). From this po-
int of view the system of influence is unstable (thus allowing
open and egalitarian redemption of token arguments, thewhole
process leading to consensus) only if class structure and diffe-
rences in interpretative schemes are disregarded, and this is
exactly what happens in the "new" theories. When the men-
tioned two characteristics are taken into account, two modes
of inequality that permeate the system of influence are re-
vealed, the structural and the relational inequality of the sys-
tem of influence, leading to the fragmentation of publics, which
are unable to find consensuswith communicativemeans. Only
compromises are feasible, reached with strategic actions.
The second difficulty with newer theories emerges from
the entrenched sovereignty of the members of the public in
the lifeworld. In the latter, the individual is supposed to be able
to protect him/herself against the imposition of systemic im-
peratives of power and money, which, in principle, should
not enter into public discussion. However, in the current infor-
mation society, where immaterial labor2 assumes the hege-
monic role over other forms of labor, the lifeworld and the
system, two domains in terms of whichHabermas (1984, 1989b)
formulates his two-level conception of society, are impossible
to distinguish even analytically. Communicationprocesses,which
corporate capital requires for systemic integration of society,
permeate all aspects of life, even the reproductive, which is
especially significant for members of society, who sell imma-
terial labor in the tertiary services market of information pro-
cessing and cultural production. The colonization of the life-
world with its consequent effects (production of ideology) in
this context causes a "new" kind of refeudalization of the pub-
lic sphere. It is carried out by classes and members of the pub-
lic that did not take part in "classical" intrusion of private in-
terest in the time of modernity.
STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF INFLUENCE
The underlying idea of the "new" theories is that with the ad-
vent and use of new (digital) communication and informa-
tion technologies the "status conferral function" – ascribed to
mass media already by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948, 497) –
could be avoided, if only direct access to several discursive
forums is enabled. In other words, differences in social status
could be leveled off by numerous more or less equally presti-
gious platforms from which a plurality of actors speaks, ar-
gues Mayhew (1997, 255-260). Namely, the system of influence
is based on egalitarian grounds only when the condensed rhe-
toric of the person speaking in the name of the public can ef-
fectively be questioned, and precisely the abundance of com-







ously neutralizing the power of social status when and if nec-
essary.
Classical mass media did not offer many possibilities for
the testing of influence, as many critical scholars argued, and
the publication of critical opinions, aimed towards powerful
players of the political and economic system was something
the public wined for itself in fringe battles with the oligopo-
listic "culture industry". Some researchers have alternatively
pinned their hopes for an open and well-argued discussion
on "new" media, which are supposed to enable freer publica-
tion of opinions due to a more democratic network structure
andmore affordable access. According to Thompson, the chan-
ges in technology have brought "a new kind of mediated pu-
blicness" that denotes an infinite (boundless) space, which is
difficult to control, a space of creativity, in which content can
appear suddenly and bring about unexpected consequences
(Thompson, 1995, 246). In this way, the "new" theories argue,
an internet newspaper with a small number of readers can cast
doubt upon the reporting of a large TV network. By the same
pattern, a weak interest group can confront an influential mul-
ti-national corporation or a responsible news reporter can dis-
close and oppose manipulation and censorship imposed by
political or economic figures. Considering traditional media,
every effort at effective publicizing of opinions occurs in two
phases, in which the speaker, firstly, attempts to influence the
media, and then the media, in turn, attempts to influence the
audience by passing messages (Mayhew, 1997, 252). At first
sight it would be reasonable to argue that with the develop-
ment of the Internet, the producer and the distributor of opi-
nions could be the same person or group, and that the two step
process of influencing could be reduced to one phase, or bet-
ter, to one communicator, directly accessing the platform for
distribution of information and simultaneously demanding the
argumentative redemption of rhetoric of competing groups.
However, the change in the possession of technology
(media) neither guarantees greater plurality of opinions nor
more democratic public debate. Even free publication of the
opinions on the Internet does not add much to the effective-
ness of the demands for justification of influence of compet-
ing public actors. Technology remains in the hands of privi-
leged social classes, given that the ever-increasing commodi-
fication of information and technologies never chooses themar-
ginalized and disenfranchised to be the first to take advan-
tage of these trends (Jordan, 1999, 161). What is more, Inter-
net content is being commercialized just as are communica-
tions and portals, which purveyors of information services
are attempting to make as user-friendly and undemanding as







2000, 22). The audience is segmented according to the supply
side strategies, aimed at attracting those with the highest sum
of discretionary income, which are later sold to the highest
bidding advertisers. In an appointed segment, no place is re-
served for values that are incompatible with values that sup-
port the social status of public figures that attract segmented
audiences. In the field of non-commercial, alternative and com-
munity media, the picture is similar, just that their audiences
are not sold to advertisers. There is no guarantee that the com-
petitive segment is not built on precisely opposite values to
those, defended by adversary public actors. To use the langu-
age of economic theory, the supply side offers a set of values,
from among which the demand side, according to its differ-
ent preferences, chooses from. In this process the plurality of
closed discursive communities with distinguished values is built
up. In his revised theory, Habermas provides exactly such a
structure of partial and autonomous public spheres, which
compete for the visibility in and the recognition from the me-
dia and the political system (Habermas, 1996, 358). However,
he does not illustrate how partial publics can transform their
interests in order to achieve a mutual agreement. To say that
there is a possibility of the common public sphere does not
resolve the question of dissenting and competitive publics. If
some norms and values are not commonly accepted, then the
appointed social status of the platform or of the public actor
cannot induce trust in the offered symbolic public.
In accordancewith thementioned linkage between values
and influence, a certain acknowledged social status has the
power to persuade those who affirm the values on which the
social status is based. And if we follow the opinion formation
processes from the viewpoint of the concept of "a new kind of
publicness" (Thompson, 1995), their messages are able to per-
suade entirely different audiences, because audiences also have
different values, according to their position in the hierarchi-
cal class structure. For example, an owner of the productive
means attempts to attract citizens, who defend the current sta-
tus quo of the capitalist system of economic production, as a
worker in an industry will find a safe haven in the proletari-
an public sphere, where conditions for change are explicated.
This is the result of the fact that the first one has entirely dif-
ferent values than the last one, which means that when they
speak fromdifferent platforms, influence is unable to steer them
towards consensus. The inability to achieve consensus in the
first phase of influencing, when influence functions on the ba-
sis of trust in public actors – and arguments are not yet deman-
ded nor provided for redemption of rhetorical tokens –, is the
consequence of the structural inequality of status and prestige







RELATIONAL INEQUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF INFLUENCE
Andwhy does not the process of persuasion even in the last in-
stance – in our case in the second phase of persuasion – lead
to an effective validation of arguments and later to consensus?
This validation is called relational because it tries communi-
catively to transform at least two different interpretations, based
on particular arguments, of the same objective reality.
Mayhew has argued that the ideology of the free market
and a strategically oriented "rhetoric of presentation" prevent
the arguments to be brought to the fore to test influence: "The
rhetoric of presentation takes the rhetorical token to be suffi-
cient in itself, and needing no redemption. Images speak for
themselves and slogans do not require explication" (Mayhew,
1997, 274). To resolve this situation, Mayhew demanded that
the backing of influence is tested on discursive forums, where
the validation of arguments is carried out, but this is a highly
idealistic stance, because ideologically supported values do
not allow their own transformation simply by argumentative
persuasion, or rather, every argumentative persuasion is also
subjective, because it is grounded in the material conditions
in which people live. And these conditions shape the interests
that propel the actions of particular actors. For example, the
manager of a company cannot by objective arguments per-
suade a member of a trade union to work more time for a lesser
wage, as the owner of the company longs for. In other words,
we cannot have an objective position towards the objective
world, nor can we objectively present our arguments: "To say
that there is a world independent of our experiences of it and
practical activities within it is not at all the same thing as argu-
ing that we can be independent of that world, that we can rise
above the social interests coursing through our social locations
and identifications. Thus we can legitimately say that there is
no such thing as an objective subject" (Wayne, 2003, 226). Even
"objective" arguments are shaped according to the interests that
stand behind public actors and for this reason the persuasion
to be effective has to be directed to social levels which share
similar values as the persuader does – or the persuasion has
to be manipulative or/and strategic to change the worldview
of groups and classes on different levels of society's structure,
adapting their thinking and values to seize the reality in the
form the persuader offers it. "New" theories argue the op-
posite: competing interests can be transformed by the use of
arguments. Arguments enable the testing of influence because
theories accept the liberal conception of society, in which in-
terests are the immediate result of autonomously functioning
human beings. The materialistic conception of the world is
different and accentuates that ideas, consciousness and inter-1043
ests are conditioned by material circumstances, which differ-
entiate according to the class structure. This inequality prevents
individuals from different classes to transform their interest
towards the same goal or common good, because the concep-
tion of common good is different according to the actors' posi-
tions. Differences in interpretative schemes are exposed in ma-
ny research projects that interconnect the interpretation of me-
diated content with the interest depending on the location of
people in the broader context of the economic system, thuswith
social relations of production and class structure (see Golding
and Murdock, 2000, 85). The interpretation of the facts that
stand alone is not problematic, people can interpret them in
the same way, understand the speaker. What is problematic is
the one-dimensional interpretation and consequent transfor-
mation of interest that the arguments are supporting. The
inability to provide backing of influence with arguments that
all would use to understand (and accept as legitimate) partic-
ular interest in the same way, makes relational inequality of two
or more subjects the common object of attention.
The process, marked by structural and relational inequal-
ity of the system of influence, then leads to the formation of
many publics with more or less stable beliefs that have their
base in the values of certain competing groups with their dis-
tinguished ideologies. Be the status order ever so fluid, it is formed
by hegemonic values, which are transmitted by the media and
influential public figures thereby closing the influence loop –
the loop in which the influential ones (media and prestigious
public actors) define who has the power to persuade the cho-
sen segment of the public. Therefore, the persuaded ones are
those with similar values and similar social standing.
In principle, unequal conditions of media production and
reproduction of life should not influence the public debate.
However, these conditions determine the means of struggle
of various groups for intellectual andmoral leadership of a given
society. Therefore, results of the analysis of material condi-
tions of media production and public opinion formation pro-
cesses, in which concepts of newer theories are inserted, come
to resembleGramsci's (2003) description of the struggle of groups
for a hegemonic role in society. Under such circumstances, the
strategic struggle for visibility is conducted according to the
principle of "equal opportunity," which is by far and away not
"freedom of achievement" for all. This means that those who
are in an underprivileged position and whose life context is
created by more powerful forces than their own, attempt to
achieve the achievable within the framework of pre-established
constraints, unless they use strategic means to accomplish their
goal. James Bohman critically assessed the difference between







tive democracy cannot be based on the assumption that all ci-
tizens are of equal social standing nor that they can all skill-
fully take advantage of opportunities (Bohman, 1997, 326). The
system of influence is hierarchically organized, and although
all have the opportunity to persuade, the levers by which the
hierarchy of social status is determined and accordingly influ-
ence as well, is out of reach of their communicative action.
The above-mentioned closed loop of influence can only be re-
opened by means of strategic struggle.
The difference between "new" theories of the public and
critical politico-economically oriented theories lies in the fact
that according to the former, the conditions of participation in
the public discussion can be communicative (oriented toward
agreement) under certain "objective" circumstances,whichwould
in the last instance allow argumentative persuasion, whereas
according to the latter, conditions of participation in public life
are always marked by the social relations of production. And
these last conditions are marked by an unsolvable conflict be-
tween capital and labor. In reality, this is shown by the un-
equal standing of the platforms from which members of the
public speak: a member of the working class has an entirely
different economic and social position from which he can dis-
tribute messages and emphasize values – thereby augment-
ing status and influence – than a member of the political or e-
conomic elite. In other words, political economy is interested
in the very conditions and socio-economic resources, which
enable a certain public prolocutor to cast doubt upon the in-
fluence of the competitor from different social standing. The
interpretation of media content itself is not problematic, nor
is testing/sampling of influence as a symbolic form. It hap-
pens quite straightforward in partial public spheres. Proble-
matic are the broader conditions (1) under which public fi-
gures compete for media attention (the sphere of message
production and distribution), (2) the conditions under which
transformation of particular interests takes place (the horizon
of life experience). These conditions are not equal and cannot be
equal for all under any circumstances, even when we step on
the public forum, where the power of the argument is a ma-
xim. These conditions depend, in turn, on the economic (phy-
sical and financial), social, and cultural capital of public fi-
gures and audiences, as Bourdieu (2003) would have it. When
we relate these forms of capital with the social standing of
members of the public, we see that production, dissemination
and interpretation of mediated content are determined by
the position of the members of the public in the mode of pro-
duction, as is shown in the next chapter. It is also presented,
how ideology of the freemarket and entrepreneurship produces
social context in which some forms of agreement between pu-







FUSION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND THE MARKET
Through strategic framing, segments of the public adapt dis-
semination of information to their advantage as is shown by
the theory of framing (Pan and Kosicki, 2001) or already in the
1980s' analysis of subsidizing information in the media (Gan-
dy, 1982), with which the desired communicative integration
of society actually unfolds as a strategic struggle. At first sight
the above-mentioned compartmentalization or fragmenta-
tion of the public sphere is incompatible with the assumption
that it is possible to find some common basis, foundation, vi-
tal context, common culture or rather common values, onwhich
to continue a public debate and which will yield an agree-
ment among themembers of the public, who do not share com-
mon life experiences. Still, as newer theories demonstrate,
people can reach a kind of agreement or at least they are able
to achieve the conformity of their acts with the appeals of o-
thers. I argue that in the "new" models of the public, agree-
ment is achievable only because the theories presuppose an
objective picture of reality – the autonomous base – that all
members of the public share. However, conception of the au-
tonomous base is possible only if the positions and conflicts in
the class hierarchy are forcibly put in brackets, which causes
the rationality of the people to become unproblematic.
In Habermas' theory, language can form such a basis, which
already carries with it the potential for rational argumentation,
together with "culturally-rooted pre-understanding" (Haber-
mas, 1984, 100), which guarantees a basic set of meanings and
basic norms for collocutors. Similarly, Mayhew formulates his
model firstly in terms of competing interests, based on which
discourse calling for solidarity amongmembers of societywould
enable the formation of post-conventional norms suitable for
new post-modern identities (Mayhew, 1997, 286). Both au-
thors emphasize building and existence of fundamental com-
mon social norms and a common objective world view, which
ought to be shared by all participants in the debate.
Habermas indicated the problem of achieving consensus
among individuals of differing class backgrounds already in
his analysis of the decline of the liberal bourgeois public sphere.
In this earlier model of the public sphere, sovereignty of the
members of the public was based in the private sphere of pro-
duction. With the advent of the post-industrial society and an
altered view of reality, newer theories – epitomized, once a-
gain, by those of Habermas – no longer posit the crux of sov-
ereignty of members of the public in the private sphere, rather
in the life-world inwhich activity is oriented toward agreement
and inwhich systemic imperatives ofmoney and power are de-
nied entry. The entire concept of the public sphere loses its1046
materialistic character, which was used to explain the invasion
of organized private interests in the public sphere – the refeu-
dalization of the public sphere. With that change, the public
also gains a measure of autonomy based upon rationality and
responsible undertaking of certain public figures and weak in-
stitutions of civil society (Habermas, 1994, 30). The main em-
phasis is on the ability to constrain the manipulative tenden-
cies of the system, or rather, on an objective view of the world,
which in previous theories was shrouded by the veil of ideo-
logy. In the post-modern world, ideology3 should be a thing of
the past in which conflicts between labor and capital did exist,
althoughwith newmeans of production, diversification ofways
of living, and greater accessibility of information, they are dis-
missed or, at least, immediately detected for what they are.
Therefore, it is no longer necessary to conceal them with be-
hind-ideological scheme (various media, educational systems,
religion,…). In other words, theories assume that the econo-
mic system needs no ideological excuse for disciplining the
underprivileged social strata, or rather, such activities are im-
mediately revealed as ideological indoctrination. If Haber-
mas' earlier description of the public sphere was predicated on
the assumption that spheres of production and ensuing social
relations manipulate the public and its behavior, now, the pu-
blic can constrain these tendencies. One can present the dif-
ference in conception as follows. According to earlier concep-
tions, economic and political power dictated the behavior of
the public. "New" theories conceive of the public as able to de-
mand services of a given political system autonomously. In
the former case, an individual is conscientious and irrational.
In the latter case, an individual's behavior is rational and inde-
pendent of structures of economic and political power.
The philosophy of realism does not accept such a "new"
straightforward conception of the world. Theories, which are
based on historical materialism, through analysis of actuality,
indicate a fusion of the public sphere with the market and
problematize the rational behavior of the public. Fredrick
Jameson (1991) is an example of this. Content from the public
sphere always appears in some broader market, be it the mar-
ket of lifestyles, goods, or even consumer-style activism. Through
this, the market, or rather a model of circulation, remains the
only one sufficient to offer people a vision of totality, an entire
reality. As Ženko explains, the central objective of Fredrick
Jameson's work is to show "the inability of the post-modern
subject to confront the totality of systems, which surround
him." (Ženko, 2003, 90). This inability also serves to explain
why status- and class- differentiated actors do not bring into







According to Althusser (2000), relations of production
reproduce ideology by representing the imaginary relation-
ship of people to the real relation of production. Ideology
emerges from these relations of exploitation as relations of
class conflict. The difference between the functioning of ide-
ological schemes (educational, cultural, political, information-
al, …) in industrial and post-industrial capitalism lies in the
fact that people in our time are directly included in the pro-
duction of ideological forms. These are, for example, media
content, representations of reality and the public, lifestyles, in
short, all products with any symbolic meaning. Today, the in-
dividual is no longer merely a consumer of ideological forms,
but rather a producer thereof. He is forced into this position
by the domination of immaterial labor and forms of produc-
tion, which are characterized by the action of knowledge u-
pon knowledge itself. Workers become prosumers (producers-
-consumers) and owners of the means of production (infor-
mation and communication technologies, knowledge, colla-
boration networks), which they need for immaterial produc-
tion, while also being independent entrepreneurs, cultural
workers, news reporters, who work according to current en-
trepreneurial principles. The once enforced class struggle be-
tween owners of the means of production (machines, facto-
ries, etc.) and workers, who used to compete only in the labor
market, is continued by workers in their own class among
themselves as independent production units of economic va-
lue. This class struggle within a given class itself produces ideo-
logy. Phil Graham described vividly the unification of con-
sumption and production in a knowledge society and inclu-
sion of people in an exchange of symbols, knowledge and re-
presentations:
Once informed, people can then reproduce, reconfigure,
and redistribute their knowledge in an infinitely complex
cycle of social interactions and exchanges. 'Consumers' of
knowledge are simultaneously its producers; language is
the primary means of exchange. This holds for all kinds of
valuable knowledge, from currency trades, to advertising
and political propaganda, to secrets sold by inside traders
on the stockmarket, to inventors of new techniques for ma-
nipulating DNA. (Graham, 2006, 73)
In a knowledge society, thinking becomes work, which
ascribes meaning to symbols and through exchange enables
their continual (re)production. Therefore, Graham, in his ana-
lysis entitled "Hypercapitalism" explains that it is impossible
to distinguish the lifeworld from the system analytically. Im-
material labor has overtaken the role as leading form of labor







means that it determines the organization of production in all
other spheres of immediate production of economic value
and in the lifeworld as well. Consumers of ideological forms
have also become their producers or rather consumers pre-
pare ideological forms for further exchange. Italian autono-
mists defined immaterial labor as a force, which produces know-
ledge, information, and meanings. Such labor is collective and,
according to Lazzarato (2007), exists in the form of currents
and networks. Production takes place in all spheres of life and
society, so some authors refer to a "social factory," which, in
addition to organization of production, produces ideological
forms as well. The latter represent and rationalize pre-exist-
ing social relations as the only possible ones that are mean-
ingful and natural.
From this analysis of condition for participation in the
public sphere, it is possible to extract two processes: fragmen-
tation of the life experiences of members of the public and
their virtual rehabilitation in the "hyper-refeudalized" bour-
geois public sphere. Namely, members of the public, who have
differing interests, can each buy their own realities in the
framework of a totality of a market, and the market model is
the common basis, the source of values and truth about the
world, which serves as an anchor for argumentation. Confron-
tation of these realities takes place in the system which gives
rise to a strategic struggle for serving individual interests ra-
ther than conducting an autonomous public debate. Agree-
ment is more readily reached among competing interests by
agreeing on compromises (by way of rewards and sanctions
mediated by money and power) than by transforming inter-
ests, since compromises most frequently suppress difficulties,
which emerge as soon as another opportunity for them arises.
ENFORCED PICTURE OF THE COMMON WORLD
Newer theories are rather critical towards the dominance of
strategic rationality in the public sphere, as an example of this,
one could consider Mayhew (1997), which describes the phe-
nomenon of "theNewPublic", formed by instrumentalized per-
suasion, advertising, lobbying, and other forms of manipu-
lation. The way out of this situation that theories offer is to de-
mand plurality of the media and responsible behavior of civil
society. However, the possibility of publishing opinions criti-
cal of the activities of elites should not be equated with the
ability to persuade, with the effective freedom of communi-
cation. A "supply-side" analysis of various media and influen-
tial public speakers reveals its hierarchical structure and, fur-
thermore, that public figures with more socio-economic re-
sources and means of persuasion often completely disregard







with strategic struggle as a means of becoming visible and
recognizable. The public sphere is not refeudalized only by
the most powerful class, rather the demise of the public is tak-
ing place in intense mini "refeudalizations" of countless pub-
lic spheres in which a conflict for the servicing of special in-
terests is raging, which emerge from highly-vertically-orien-
ted, densely-differentiated structural inequalities of contem-
porary societies. In this context ideology provides an "objec-
tive" picture of reality and, accordingly, the unity of the source
of life experiences of members of the public. The exploited
and the exploiter become equal in public due to an equal pic-
ture of the reality. Furthermore, since the interests of all pub-
lic actors are of equal origin in the circulation model (the mar-
ket), they are equally legitimate, thereby obscuring the con-
flict between labor and capital. Consequently, class conflict in
the system becomes invisible, while the common public inter-
est strides to preserve a broad entrepreneurial sector and jus-
tification of enforced solidarity among members of society.
The public sphere, as described above, has become a do-
main of manipulation, hyperinflation of meanings and finali-
ty, the domination of the powerful over the weak, instru-
mentalization of public debate, which is far from the whole
story. If such a totality of the real world were factually to lull
everything and everybody to sleep and would do away with
conflicts, then the described "new" refeudalization is a model
of a perfectly-efficient public sphere, in which there is even
no need for communicative means of social integration – mar-
ket exchange and fantasy production ideally yields the com-
mon good. However, powerful public actors of the political
and economic system often encounter resistance, opposition.
Therefore, it would be mistaken to view conditions for public
debate as complete, firm, and unchangeable. They are deter-
mined through activity in a struggle of class versus class and
competition among members of the same class to establish a
ruling ideology. Therefore, an individual activity is fundamen-
tal to understanding power relations. Apparently-perfect con-
ditions for reproduction of human society present themselves
as the most sensible and natural only through continual effort
on the part of that class, of individuals and groups, who seek
dominance, which in some respect fits Gramsci's description
of the struggle of classes and groups for domination through
intellectual and moral leadership of society.
NOTES
1 By refeudalization of the public, Habermas denotes those charac-
teristics of the public, which induce the fusion of the public and pri-
vate spheres. When organized private interests invade the public,
certain special interests are portrayed as public, which encompasses







Presenting interests in this way thereby includes taking a political
stance (Habermas, 1989a, 213). Forming and working with the pub-
lic, which takes place through public relations, regains feudal char-
acter by displaying privileged private interests: "Suppliers shine in a
representative fashion in front of their devoted consumers" (Haber-
mas, 1989a, 215).
2 Immaterial labor denotes application of various skills and know-
ledge required to process information as well as activities, which are
not immediately recognizable as work, specifically, in establishing
aesthetic norms, production of life styles, values, and, last but not
least, production of public opinion. (Lazzarato, 2007)
3 In the philosophical tradition of realism, ideology denotes process-
es, which lead to a skewing of views of the world. Because of the in-
sidious activity of ideology "behind our backs" people are ignorant
of the origins of interests in the relations of production. Therefore,
people consider interests to be independent of one's position in a
social hierarchy, from which interests emerge. Furthermore, people
conceive of their position in the world as following from the realiza-
tion of their own autonomous interests, while the interests of the fel-
low people form the objective environment in which they blaze a
trail of realizing their life's potential.
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"Nove" teorije javnosti i aktualnosti:
hijerarhijski sustav utjecaja
i hegemonija nematerijalnog rada
Peter SEKLOČA
Znanstveno-istraživački centar, Koper
U članku se razmatraju "nove" teorije javnosti, ponekad nazvane
i "postmodernim" teorijama, koje ističu otvorenost posredovane
javne sfere i množinu simboličkih javnosti i koje pronalaze
interesne moduse uz pomoć upravljačkih sposobnosti sustava
utjecaja. Autor tvrdi da je moguće zamisliti konsenzus između
simboličkih javnosti samo zato što su ove teorije zasnovane na
liberalnoj tradiciji, što pretpostavlja da će interesi i racionalnost
pripadnika javnosti biti autonomni u odnosu na materijalne
uvjete u kojima žive. Kada se primjenjuje historijsko-
-materijalistička misao, otkrivaju se dvije vrste nejednakosti koje
se šire sustavom utjecaja, a to su strukturna i relacijska
nejednakost. One u stvarnosti vode stvaranju djelomičnih
javnosti i fragmentirane javne sfere. Ipak, javni subjekti ne
dovode u pitanje podrijetlo spomenutih nejednakosti, jer u
vremenima hegemonije nematerijalnoga rada oni (javni
subjekti) ujedno su i potrošači i proizvođači ideoloških oblika







modelu kruženja (tržišta). Stvaranje zajedničkoga pogleda na
svijet tada stvara neutralnu podlogu za "novu" vrstu
refeudalizacije javne sfere. Nju sada provode klase i pripadnici
javnosti koji nisu sudjelovali u "klasičnom" upletanju privatnih
interesa u javnu sferu u moderno vrijeme.
Ključne riječi: javnost, mediji, utjecaj, nematerijalni rad,
ideologija
„Neue“ Theorien über Öffentlichkeit
und Aktualität: Das hierarchische




In diesem Artikel werden „neue“ Öffentlichkeitstheorien
untersucht, die mitunter auch als „postmoderne“ Theorien
bezeichnet werden. Diese betonen die Offenheit der
vermittelten Öffentlichkeitssphäre und die vielfaltigen Formen
symbolischer Öffentlichkeit, die mit Hilfe des Verwaltungs-
Knowhows großer Einflusssysteme ihre Interessen geltend
machen. Der Verfasser vertritt die These, dass ein Konsensus
zwischen symbolischen Öffentlichkeitsformen denkbar sei,
allein deshalb weil diese Theorien in der liberalen Tradition
begründet seien. Dies setze nämlich voraus, dass Interessen
und Rationalität von Öffentlichkeitsvertretern autonom sind in
Bezug auf ihre materiellen Lebensumstände. Gemäß dem
historisch-materialistischen Denken erschließen sich zwei
Formen der Ungleichheit, die sich in Einflusssystemen
ausbreiten: strukturale Ungleichheit sowie Ungleichheit in den
Beziehungen. Diese Formen der Ungleichheit resultieren in der
Entstehung partialer Öffentlichkeiten und fragmentierter
Öffentlichkeitssphären. Dennoch wird der Ursprung genannter
Ungleichheitsformen von den in der Öffentlichkeit agierenden
Subjekten nicht in Frage gestellt, denn in Zeiten der Dominanz
immaterieller Arbeit sind die öffentlichen Subjekte zugleich
Verbraucher und Hersteller ideologischer Denkformen, die eine
„objektive“ Sicht der auf dem Modell der Zirkulation (des
Marktes) begründeten Welt hervorbringen. Die Schaffung einer
gemeinsamen Weltsicht bringt so eine neutrale Grundlage für
eine „neue“ Art der Refeudalisierung der Öffentlichkeitssphäre
hervor. Diese wird nun beherrscht von Klassen und
Öffentlichkeitsvertretern, die an der „klassischen“ Einflussnahme
privater Interessen auf die öffentliche Sphäre der modernen Zeit
nicht teilhatten.
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immaterielle Arbeit, Ideologie1053
DRU[. ISTRA@. ZAGREB
GOD. 19 (2010),
BR. 6 (110),
STR. 1037-1053
SEKLOČA, P.:
"NEW" THEORIES...
